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MAKE CAMPAIGN COVERAGE GREAT AGAIN:
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS, THE PRESS, AND THE RIGHT
OF ACCESS
Maximilian J. Mescall*
I. INTRODUCTION
As news organizations multiply and cater to niche fields and interests,
Americans have flocked towards news sources that fit their ideological
preferences.1 For instance, eighty-eight percent of consistent conservatives
have a positive view of Fox News, while consistent liberals are more likely
to rely on NPR, PBS, the New York Times or the BBC for their news.2
Although more Americans follow the news, the public has moved away from
television and print mediums, where news sources attempt to appeal to a
broader audience, to blogs or ideologically consistent television such as the
O’Reilly or Daily Show.3 Meanwhile, on social media, consistent
conservatives and consistent liberals are more likely to defriend or unfollow
people who share political views contrary to their own.4 This shift in
American news consumption results in fewer Americans receiving news
from multiple sources or viewpoints.5

*
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Hafetz, for his guidance and support in the writing of this Comment.
1
Today’s Washington Press Corps More Digital, Specialized D.C.-based Newspaper
Staff Focus on Congress, but Wire Services Account for Most of What Readers See,
PEWRESEARCH (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.journalism.org/2015/12/03/todays-washingtonpress-corps-more-digital-specialized/.
2
Amy Mitchell et al., Political Polarization & Media Habits, PEWRESEARCH (Oct. 21,
2014), http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/.
3
Americans Spending More Time Following the News: Ideological News Sources: Who
Watches and Why, PEWRESEARCH (Sept. 12, 2010), http://www.people-press.org/2010/09/12/
americans-spending-more-time-following-the-news/.
4
Mitchell, supra note 2.
5
Id. (“When it comes to getting news about politics and government, liberals and
conservatives inhabit different worlds. There is little overlap in the news sources they turn to
and trust.”). But see id. (“The study also suggests that in America today, it is virtually
impossible to live in an ideological bubble. Most Americans rely on an array of outlets—
with varying audience profiles—for political news. And many consistent conservatives and
liberals hear dissenting political views in their everyday lives.”).

1653

MESCALL (DO NOT DELETE)

1654

6/25/2018 5:37 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1653

This ideological split bled into the 2016 presidential campaign. At a
rally for Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, campaign staff approached
Ben Schreckinger, a Politico reporter, called security, and escorted him from
the premises.6 Schreckinger had obtained an admission ticket to the event,
but had not been granted the press credentials7 he requested.8 The story was
a common one in the 2016 presidential election, with the Trump campaign
expelling reporters from Vice News,9 Univision,10 the Washington Post,11
and other news outlets from campaign events.12
The Trump campaign’s actions were the result of a blacklist of news
organizations the campaign believed treated Trump unfairly.13 After the
editorial board of The Des Moines Register called for then-candidate Trump
to bow out of the race, it became the first media outlet placed on the
blacklist.14 From there, the list expanded to at least half a dozen news
organizations that were denied the access and privileges that come with press
credentials, including access to the campaign’s news conferences.15 Some
6
Ben Schreckinger, Trump Security Removes POLITICO Reporter from Rally, POLTICO
(June 3, 2016, 12:50 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-trump-securitypolitico-reporter-223856.
7
Jeffrey P. Hermes et al., Who Gets a Press Pass? Media Credentialing Practices in
the United States, BERKMAN CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y, June 2014, https://papers.ssrn.com/so
l3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2451239 (“For decades, journalists at established news
organizations have routinely applied for and been granted credentials by government bodies
at the federal, state and local levels, from the White House all the way down to local police
and fire departments. Private organizations also often control access to other events, such as
concerts, sporting events and political conventions. Despite some unease and tensions, many
reporters have maintained working relationships with these agencies and their officials. Some
media organizations have obtained a standing [sic], generic set of credentials that are used
interchangeably by their reporters; in other cases, a press badge from a recognized news
organization may prompt an informal ‘wave through’ by officials, allowing special access at
accident scenes, government events, and other restricted areas.”).
8
Schreckinger, supra note 6.
9
Harper Neidig, Reporter Arrested at Trump Campaign Event, THE HILL (Sept. 17,
2016 4:09 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/296477-reporter-arrest
ed-at-trump-campaign-stop.
10
Theodore Schleifer, Univision Anchor Ejected from Trump News Conference, CNN
(Aug. 26, 2015, 11:52 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/25/politics/donald-trump-megynkelly-iowa-rally/index.html.
11
Tom Kludt and Brian Stelter, Donald Trump Revokes Washington Post Press
Credentials, CNN (June 14, 2016, 11:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/13/media/do
nald-trump-washington-post-credentials/index.html.
12
Tom Kludt and Brian Stelter,’The Blacklist’: Here Are the Media Outlets Banned by
Donald Trump, CNN (June 14, 2016, 12:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/14/media/d
onald-trump-media-blacklist/.
13
Id.
14
Eliza Collins, Trump Ends Media Blacklist: ‘I Figure They Can’t Treat Me Any
Worse!’, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2016, 12:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/polit
ics/onpolitics/2016/09/07/donald-trump-media-blacklist/89951650/.
15
Kludt, supra note 12.
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media advocates expressed concern that blacklisting “could have a chilling
effect on other outlets’ coverage of Trump,”16 while others believed the
campaign was correct to punish these news organizations for their
dishonesty.17 While the Trump campaign’s actions were well known and
documented, other presidential candidates have also engaged in selective
access.18
The Supreme Court has found viewpoint discrimination problematic
when the entity denying the press access is a government actor.19 Under the
First Amendment, the Court has recognized the press’s right of access to
government buildings, but for the past fifty years declined to further address
the doctrine.20 The doctrine is meant to prevent government from providing
selective access to members of the press or public who promote a certain
viewpoint.21 It fosters open access to government and subjects it to scrutiny
from its citizens.22
Campaigns, however, have a special interest in promoting a certain
viewpoint, namely, that their candidates would best represent the interests of
the electorate.23 The history of granting press credentials access24 combined
with the fact that campaigns are private actors meant there was no need to
extend the constitutional right of access to presidential campaigns.25 In
recent campaigns, the denial of press access, due to ideological differences
and how Americans select news sources, has created a new need to expand
the right of access. While some may argue that other media outlets can
16

Id.
The O’Reilly Show, Bill O’Reilly Supports Trump’s Media Blacklist: ‘If Someone Is
Being Dishonest . . .’ FOX NEWS (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82vGi
EkCLb8.
18
See Dylan Byers, Clinton Campaign Denies Access to Pool Reporter, POLTICO (June
15, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2015/06/clinton-campaigndenies-access-to-pool-reporter-208839; Rachel Sklar, Obama’s Revenge: New Yorker
Reporter Excluded from Press Plane for Overseas Trip, HUFFINGTON POST (July 28, 2008,
5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/21/obamas-revenge-emnew-york_n_113
969.html.
19
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or
the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”).
20
Luke M. Milligan, First Amendment Discussion Group: Rethinking Press Rights of
Equal Access, 65 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2008).
21
Id.
22
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
23
Michael D. Shear, For Both Campaigns, a Need to Control the Message, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/us/politics/for-romney-and-obama-aneed-to-control-the-message.html (“There is almost nothing more valuable to a presidential
campaign than controlling the message.”).
24
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
25
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
17

MESCALL (DO NOT DELETE)

1656

6/25/2018 5:37 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1653

republish an article of another journalist who was granted access, this
argument is hollow. By granting selective access, campaigns control the
initial public perception of the event, thus undermining an ideologically
opposite news source’s ability to provide a contrary interpretation.26 Since
presidential campaigns are so integral to the American democratic process,
courts should recognize a right to access for press following campaigns and
protect against viewpoint discrimination.27
This Comment will examine the right to access for members of the
press to the general election campaigns of presidential candidates. Part II of
this Comment will briefly summarize the two leading interpretations of the
Freedom of the Press Clause in the First Amendment. Part III will argue that
campaigns are necessary to the function of government and therefore
constitute state actors subject to constitutional limitations. Part IV will
discuss the recognized right to access government buildings which the press
currently enjoys. Part V will lay out the “Enumerated Reasons Rule” which
provides the courts with guidance for balancing the press’s and the
campaign’s interests. Part VI will conclude.
II. ORDINARY OR EXTRAORDINARY PROTECTION: INTERPRETING THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Unlike most constitutional amendments, the First Amendment has little
historical or original understanding.28 The first Congress, which passed the
amendment, maintained no records defining its terms nor held significant
discussions concerning the amendment’s implementation.29 This has led the
First Amendment generally, and the press clause specifically, to acquire an
ambiguous nature subject to multiple interpretations.30 In this vacuum, two
primary interpretations of the press clause have arisen. The first, the Fourth
Estate theory, contends that Congress created the press clause to provide
special rights to journalists and reporters who would act as the People’s
watchdog over the three branches of government.31 The second, the pressas-a-technology theory, argues that the clause is meant to ensure ordinary
26
See Ilana Friedman, Where Public and Private Spaces Converge: Discriminatory
Media Access to Government Information, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 285 (2006).
27
See Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The free press is the guardian
of the public interest, and the independent judiciary is the guardian of the free press. Thus,
courts have a duty to conduct a thorough and searching review of any attempt to restrict public
access.”).
28
Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, The First Amendment Originalism of Justices
Brennan, Scalia and Thomas, 17 COMM. L. POL’Y 385, 390 (2012).
29
Id. (citing David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV.
455, 485 (1983)).
30
Id.
31
See generally Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49 (2016)
(arguing in favor of adoption of the Fourth Estate interpretation of the Press Clause).
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citizens have a right to distribute their thoughts via publication that are
ancillary to the First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech.32
A. The Fourth Estate Interpretation
In early American history, printing technology was limited to “a highly
select group of people” who “served as gatekeepers by adhering to a
developed set of ethical norms.”33 Some evidence suggests that the Founders
were comfortable with providing special rights and access to members of the
press.34 Low literacy rates, the costs of obtaining and maintaining a printing
press and favorable tax treatment all imply that originally the press was an
elite group meant to monitor government actions and inform the people of
important events.35 In this role as gatekeepers, the press served as
“purposeful actors in the political process, linking parties, voters, and the
government together.”36 In today’s media, journalists continue to act as
moderators, organizing the debate to provide the coherence and structure
necessary for public consumption.37 Essentially, the Fourth Estate
interpretation suggests that the Press Clause fulfilled a dual purpose: to
provide the People with the ability to “express their sentiments regardless of
the purpose or content” and to provide a “checking function—to examine the
proceedings of government.”38
The Fourth Estate’s interpretation of the press is not strictly limited to
professional journalists.39 Instead, “the press clause of the First Amendment
not only protects the ability of the press to speak, but also protects certain
types of press behavior.”40 Like freedom of expression or freedom of
religion, the individual receives protection from the First Amendment by
32

See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or For the Press
as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012) (arguing the
press-as-a-technology interpretation of the Press Clause is proper).
33
West, supra note 31, at 72.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 73–81.
36
Id. at 88 (citing JEFFERY L. PASLEY, “THE TYRANNY OF PRINTERS”: NEWSPAPER
POLITICS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 3 (2001)).
37
Id. at 103 (“Mass communication without journalists resembles ‘a town meeting with
no moderator and no agenda; freedom of speech may be maximized but to no common
purpose.’”) (quoting Anderson, supra note 29, at 333).
38
West, supra note 31, at 66–67 (internal quotations omitted).
39
Benjamin Oliphant, Freedom of the Press as a Discrete Constitutional Guarantee, 59
MCGILL L.J. 283, 302 (2013) (“Just as freedom of expression is afforded equally to all to the
extent they are engaging in expression . . . freedom of the press should be available to all who
are engaging in press-like activity—from the lonely pamphleteer or pajama-clad blogger to
the institutional mainstream reporter.”).
40
Amy Jordan, The Right of Access: Is There a Better Fit than the First Amendment?,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1361 (2004) (citing Jon Paul Dits, The Press Clause and Press
Behavior: Revisiting the Implications of Citizenship, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 31 (2002)).
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acting with a certain purpose.41 Under this definition, intent, not action,
separates the journalist from the public individual.42 Simply put, the
journalist’s intent to distribute the information for public consumption,
places him within the definition of, and provides him with the protection of,
the Press Clause.43
The Court has suggested that the press has unique powers and
protections under the Press Clause. Early in the 20th Century the Court
recognized that “security of the freedom of the press requires that it should
be exempt [from] restraint . . . .”44 It has recognized, under the First
Amendment, “the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and
measures of public men of every description which has not been confined to
the strict limits of the common law” but seems to have extraordinary power.45
Indeed, the Court has held that when it comes to criticism of public officials,
newspapers are protected under the First Amendment.46 In addition to
having certain privileges, the press is also subject to certain restraints. For
example, the Court found the Federal Communication Commission’s former
fairness doctrine constitutional, which required broadcasters to provide
candidates with equal airtime so that they may address voters directly.47
Throughout history some Justices, including Justice Stewart48 and Justice
Stevens,49 argued for this interpretation.
41

Oliphant, supra note 39, at 302.
Id.
43
Id. at 299–300 (“[A]nyone who is undertaking newsgathering activity with intent to
publish or otherwise disseminate that information to the public.”).
44
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
45
Id. at 718. (quoting James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), http://p
ress-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs24.html) (internal quotations
omitted).
46
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 280–81 (1964) (holding that a public
official could not recover damages for libel from a newspaper without a showing of actual
malice).
47
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969) (subjecting broadcasters to
content neutral FCC regulation).
48
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“A corollary
of the right to publish must be a right to gather news.”); Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (“[T]he Free Press Clause extends protection to an
institution.”). See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 571–72 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (“Protection of those sources is necessary to ensure that the press can fulfill its
constitutionally designated function of informing the public . . . .”). See also Timothy B. Dyk,
Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 929–32
(1992) (“Justice Stewart’s comments [about the press] touched off a fury of debate.”);
Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add
to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975).
49
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 413 n.57 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“In fact, the Free Press Clause might be turned against Justice
SCALIA, for two reasons. First, we learn from it that the drafters of the First Amendment
did draw distinctions—explicit distinctions—between types of ‘speakers,’ or speech outlets
42
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If the Court explicitly adopts this theory, then access to presidential
campaigns becomes straightforward.50 Since the press has certain newsgathering privileges, the right to obtain a press pass would be a natural
extension of that privilege. Lower courts need only be concerned with issues
of viewpoint discrimination and prudential concerns. The Fourth Estate
argument, however, was never adopted by the Court.51 Instead, both the
Supreme Court and lower courts have effectively adopted the press-as-atechnology interpretation to the Press Clause.52
B. The Press-As-A-Technology Interpretation
The press-as-a-technology theory, like the Fourth Estate theory, is
based upon the Founders’ understanding of the press as presented in colonial
and post-independence America.53
For instance, long before the adoption of the First Amendment, press
protections included not only pamphlets, newspapers and articles, but also
books, which do not always discuss the news.54 Early American case law
supported the idea that the Press Clause applies to all persons; all persons
benefited from its protections, not just an elite group.55 Additionally,
scholars have argued it was unlikely the Founders intended to grant special
rights to the press because political elites were more likely to grant rights to
the public in its entirety rather than to a subclass of the population to which
the elites did not generally belong.56 Overall, the argument asserts the
or forms. Second, the Court’s strongest historical evidence all relates to the Framers’ views
on the press, yet while the Court tries to sweep this evidence into the Free Speech Clause, the
Free Press Clause provides a more natural textual home. The text and history highlighted by
our colleagues suggests why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, might
be able to claim special First Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds of ‘identity’based distinctions might be permissible after all. Once one accepts that much, the intellectual
edifice of the majority opinion crumbles.”) (internal citations omitted). C.f. John Paul
Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293 (1993) (arguing the First Amendment
grants individuals immunity from government prosecution for rights which are expressly
enumerated).
50
C.f. Dyk, supra note 48, at 941–44.
51
See infra text accompanying notes 52–62.
52
See, e.g., Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1291 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We
agree with our sister circuits. The protections of the First Amendment do not turn on whether
the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities
engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others’ writings, or
tried to get both sides of a story.”).
53
Volokh, supra note 32, at 468–83.
54
Id. at 481 (“Copyright law at the [adoption of the First Amendment] covered books,
maps, and charts, but not newspapers. To talk about copyright law as even potentially
related—however benignly—to the freedom of the press suggests that the freedom of the press
was seen as applicable to books.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
55
Id. at 489–97.
56
Id. at 469.
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Founders envisioned a press populated by citizen journalists, similar to
today’s news bloggers, rather than professional journalists working for
established media corporations.57
Modern American case law appears to support this definition. The
Court has extended Press Clause protections to citizens distributing a single
writing in addition to periodical news organizations.58 At times, the Court
has explicitly declined to extend privileges to the institutional press, holding
that the Constitution grants no special protections to the profession.59
Described inversely, “[t]he general public has the same right of access as
does the media.”60 Recently, the Court recognized the rise of Internet
reporting as further support for treating individuals and the institutional press
as one and the same under the First Amendment.61
While both the Fourth Estate and press-as-a-technology theories appear
viable, the Court has more consistently applied the latter in its interpretation
of the Press Clause.62 Thus, any First Amendment right to access a campaign
would apply not only to the institutional press, but the public at large.

57
C.f. Robert A. Arcamona, In This Issue, Cover Story Bloggers, Other Alternative
Media, and Access to Press Conferences, 27 COMM. LAWYER 12 (2011) (discussing the
difficulties citizen bloggers have when attempting to access government sources).
58
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“The liberty of the press is not confined
to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets . . . . The press
in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion.”).
59
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 n.8 (2001) (declining to extend protections
to reporters who invaded privacy); Houchins v. KOED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1978)
(refusing to grant the press special rights of access to prisons beyond that normally accorded
to the public); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (“The Constitution does not,
however, require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by
members of the public generally.”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708–09 (1972)
(denying reporters privilege in the context of grand jury investigations).
60
Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 788 (9th Cir. 2014).
61
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (“With the advent of the Internet
and the decline of print and broadcast media . . . the line between the media and others who
wish to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”).
62
See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (“[T]he history of the [Press]
Clause does not suggest that the authors contemplated a ‘special’ or ‘institutional’
privilege.”). But see Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 464 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“Although the Free Press Clause does not guarantee the press a preferred position over other
speakers, the Free Press Clause does ‘protec[t] [members of press] from invidious
discrimination.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §
12-20, 963 (2d ed. 1988); Jordan, supra note 40, at 1351 (“In cases following Zemel [v. Rusk],
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected [] the argument that the press enjoyed special privileges
not enjoyed by average citizens . . . .”).
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III. CAMPAIGNS AS STATE ACTORS
Campaigns are an integral part of the American electoral system.63
Without campaigns, the average person would not know a candidate’s
politics, experience or character.64 Presidential campaigns also benefit from
government protection and aid after a candidate is formally nominated at
national party conventions.65 Since general election campaigns have become
a necessary part of American democracy, presidential campaigns should be
considered state actors subject to constitutional limitations.66
A. The State Actor Test
From its inception, the Court created the state actor test to balance
“Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to
enjoy freedom of press and religion . . . .”67 It explicitly emphasized that the
freedoms of press and religion “occupy a preferred position” in our
democracy.68 Therefore, when an entity becomes “so impregnated with a
governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations
placed upon state action” the entity is regulated by the Constitution.69
The Supreme Court has held political parties to be state actors when
acting in an electoral capacity. In Nixon v. Condon, the Court addressed a
Texas statute that allowed a party to restrict its primary elections to only
white voters.70 The Court acknowledged that “a political party is merely a
voluntary association . . . it has inherent power like voluntary associations
generally to determine its own membership . . . .”71 The statute itself,
however, empowered the party commission to determine rules as to who
could vote in the primary process.72 By acting on this statutory authority,
“[w]hatever power of exclusion has been exercised by the members of the
committee has come to them . . . as the delegates of the State.”73 Declaring
63

See H. T. Reynolds, Coverage of Political Campaigns https://www1.udel.edu/htr/A
merican/Texts/campcov.html#note1 (“Those running for office must state their positions.
Otherwise, there is no real choice and elections lose their meaning.”).
64
See id.
65
See discussion infra Part III.B.
66
Although primary campaigns could conceivably be state actors subject to regulation,
such discussion falls outside the scope of this Comment. For an example of how courts have
addressed the press and primary campaigns, see American Broadcasting Companies v.
Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1977).
67
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
68
Id.
69
Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1401 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding a political party was a
state actor when it denied placement of a candidate on its ballot).
70
286 U.S. 73, 81 (1932).
71
Id. at 83.
72
Id. at 84.
73
Id. at 85.
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the law unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
the Court concluded, “when those agencies are invested with an authority
independent of the will of the association in whose name they undertake to
speak, they become to that extent the organs of the State itself, the
repositories of official power.”74 Holding thus, the Court reserved the
question of whether a political party could restrict membership absent
empowerment by a statute for a later date.75
The Court answered that question in Terry v. Adams.76 There, a private
political organization, the Jaybirds, denied African-Americans admission
into its primaries.77 Unlike in Nixon,78 the Jaybird primary excluded black
voters without any blessing from the state.79 Whoever won the Jaybird
primary, however, typically won the later Democratic primary and the
general election.80 As a result, “[t]he Democratic primary and the general
election [had] become no more than the perfunctory ratifiers of the choice
that has already been made . . . .”81 The Court reasoned that “[t]he Jaybird
primary has become an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the
elective process that determines who shall rule and govern in the county.”82
It therefore concluded that it was “immaterial that the state does not control
that part of this elective process” and the Jaybirds could not deny AfricanAmericans the right to vote any more than the state itself could.83
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision concerning state actors is
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association.84
There, a private athletic association regulated all high school interscholastic
sports in the state of Tennessee.85 Though no law required schools to join
the association or the association to accept all schools, it effectively had a
monopoly on interscholastic sport in the state and was acknowledged by the
state’s school board as the governing authority of interscholastic sports.86
When the association suspended a member school, the aggrieved school
argued the association violated its First Amendment rights.87
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 88.
Id. at 83.
345 U.S. 461 (1953).
Id. at 463.
Nixon, 286 U.S. at 73.
Terry, 345 U.S. at 465–66.
Id.
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 469–70.
531 U.S. 288 (2001).
Id. at 291–94.
Id.
Id. at 293.
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The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he nominally private character
of the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public
institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there is
no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards
to it.”88 In reaching that decision, the Court observed that the association’s
membership was drawn entirely from public schools and that the state had
effectively recognized the association as the sole interscholastic regulator in
the state.89 It concluded that “[e]ntwinement will support a conclusion that
an ostensibly private organization ought to be charged with a public
character and judged by constitutional standards; entwinement to the degree
shown here requires it.”90
Certainly, campaigns meet this basic level of entwinement. The
Constitution itself provides for the “general strictures for the election of the
President, such as the manner in which electors are to be chosen and the
qualifications for the presidency.”91 On a governmental level, the
Republican and Democratic parties “claim the membership and presumed
loyalty of virtually every elected official in the federal government . . . .”92
Since party members raise money, rally votes for candidates, appoint judges
and review candidates before supporting their electoral bids, campaigns
supported by these party structures are state actors.93
Lower federal courts have created several tests to determine
entwinement.94 One test in particular, the joint action,95 or symbolic
relationship96 test, applies when the state “has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence” with a private actor that “it must be recognized
as a joint participant in the challenged activity. . . .”97 Interdependence is a
narrowly construed test.98 The private actor must be “an indispensable part

88

Id. at 298.
Id. at 299–301.
90
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 302.
91
John D. Castiglione, Sign Here, Please: The First Amendment Implications of
Requiring a Loyalty Oath for Admission to Political Events, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 345, 353
(2006).
92
Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 2046 (2003).
93
See id.
94
Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2011) (action coerced by state);
Gritton v. Disponett, 332 F. App’x 232, 237 (6th Cir. 2009) (nexus test); Kirtley v. Rainey,
326 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (public function test); Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy
Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220, 1126 (10th Cir. 2001) (state supervision and
intent test).
95
Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1093.
96
Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1451 (10th Cir. 1995).
97
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
98
Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1451.
89
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of a state project”99 and the state must “knowingly [accept] the benefits
derived from unconstitutional behavior.”100 In essence, the private entity
must be a “willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.”101
B. The Campaigns as State Actors
While political parties are not always considered state actors,102
presidential campaigns are so integral to the electoral process that they
should be bound by the Constitution. Even if they are technically private
associations, presidential campaigns interact with various levels of
government. These interactions are mutually beneficial and satisfy the joint
action test.
The most relevant examples of a mutually beneficial relationship are
seen in the Federal Election Campaign Act,103 the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act104 and the Presidential Primary Matching Payment
Account Act,105 which are all enforced by the Federal Election Commission
(FEC).106 Under all of these acts, campaigns receive money from the federal
government in exchange for some regulation.107 For instance, the FEC
provides federal funds to campaigns while also placing limits on donations
that campaigns can obtain from private donors.108 Once parties nominate
their presidential candidates, those candidates have the opportunity to
receive that government funding.109 General federal elections are therefore
subject to oversight from the government.110

99

Id.
Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995).
101
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).
102
C.f. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 69 (1990) (holding that political
patronage to members of the same party violates due process).
103
52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146 (2012); Bipartisan Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
104
26 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9013 (2012).
105
26 U.S.C. §§ 9031–9042 (2012).
106
Castiglione, supra note 91, at 353.
107
Id.
108
Contribution Limits For 2015–2016 Federal Elections, FEC (Feb. 2015), http://www.
fec.gov/pages/brochures/contrib.shtml#Chart.
109
Presidential Election Campaign Fund, FEC (May 13, 2016), http://www.fec.gov/pre
ss/bkgnd/fund.shtml.
110
Campaign Guide for Congressional Candidates and Committees, FEC 20 (2014),
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/candgui.pdf (“A candidate is entitled to an election limit only if he or
she seeks office in that election. Thus, a candidate who loses the primary (or otherwise does
not participate in the general election) does not have a separate limit for the general.”).
100
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In addition, the federal government regulates broadcasters to ensure
that each candidate has access to television time.111 Federal law “provides
that where a radio or television station permits a legally qualified candidate
for public office to use its facilities, that station must also afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office.”112 Though this
does not automatically grant presidential candidates access to the airwaves
(candidates must pay for the time they use), these regulations ensure that
campaigns have an equal opportunity to reach voters.113
In addition to monetary and broadcasting support, presidential
campaigns receive security services directly from federal and state
governments. In presidential campaigns, the candidates’ personal security is
handled by the Secret Service114 while state and local police coordinate
security at campaign rallies and fundraising events.115 When candidates hold
town halls, rallies or speeches, municipal governments often bear some of
the costs necessary to secure the event.116
Undoubtedly, elections are a critical part of the democratic
experience,117 and various federal and state entities and the campaigns
111

John Stewart Fleming, Renewing the Chase: The First Amendment, Campaign
Advertisements and the Goal of an Informed Citizenry, 87 IND. L. J. 767, 778–89 (2012)
(discussing government regulation of broadcast media to allow equal access to airwaves by
all candidates). See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (“[Without
regulation] [s]tation owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make time
available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public issues,
people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed.”); see also
Marvin Ammori, The First Amendment and Mass Communication, 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
263 (2014) (arguing the Internet can be regulated under the free speech doctrine).
112
Russell J. Davis, Political Candidate’s Right to Equal Broadcast Time Under 47
U.S.C.A. § 315, 35 A.L.R. Fed. 856, 2a (2016).
113
Id.
114
18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)(7) (2012) (“Under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the United States Secret Service is authorized to protect the following persons . . .
Major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates and, within 120 days of the general
Presidential election, the spouses of such candidates.”).
115
See David Leventhal, Police Want Presidential Candidates to Pay Bills, JOURNAL
SENTINEL, http://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2017/01/11/police-wantpresidential-candidates-pay-bills/96447570/; Joshua Stewart, Trump’s Trip to San Diego Cost
Taxpayers $460K, THE SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (July 22, 2016), http://www.sandieg
ouniontribune.com/news/politics/sdut-trumps-trip-to-san-diego-cost-taxpayers-460-2016jul2
2-story.html; Dominic Dezzutti, The Price of Political Rallies, CBS (Feb. 17, 2012, 12:31
AM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2012/02/17/the-price-of-political-rallies/. See also Jordyn
Phelps, Who Pays When the President Travels for Campaign Events?, ABC NEWS (July 25,
2016, 7:44 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/pays-president-travels-campaign-events/sto
ry?id=40361545. C.f. Jane C. Timm, Taxpayers Foot Bill for 2016 Campaign Security,
MSNBC (June, 29, 2015, 2:14 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/taxpayers-foot-bill-2016campaign-security (discussing states covering security costs for state governors campaigning
as presidential candidates out of state).
116
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note, 115.
117
See supra text accompanying notes 63–76.
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coordinate closely during an election cycle.118 The United States Supreme
Court has, on several occasions, emphasized the importance of voting in the
democratic process.119 When articulating the importance of elections, it has
placed emphasis on the importance of voter access to a campaign’s
message.120 Because of the importance of informed voters, the Court has
curtailed broadcast media rights to ensure candidates may purchase equal
time for television commercials.121 In doing so, the Court has both explicitly
and implicitly recognized the campaign, and its purpose to convey the
candidate’s message to the voters, as an important tenant of the democratic
process.122
This analysis leads to one conclusion: the federal and state governments
are directly involved in promoting a presidential candidate’s positions of the
germane issues. Under the joint action test, campaigns and government work
in tandem for a common goal; here, that is the distribution of the candidate’s
message to the public. State or federal governments incur costs by providing
security for candidates and securing the venues where candidates appear.123
Campaigns are subject to a degree of control by the federal government
through spending and contribution limits.124 Additionally, there would be no
elected government without a general election and general elections cannot
occur without candidates and campaigns.125 Since campaigns and the federal
118
Campaigns likely must be considered state actors even in federal elections. The
federal actor designation is extremely narrow. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513
U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (“[W]here, as here, the Government creates a corporation by special
law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority
to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the
Government for purposes of the First Amendment.”).
119
See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 587 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“Encouraging citizens to vote is a legitimate, indeed essential, state objective;
for the constitutional order must be preserved by a strong, participatory democratic process.”);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 (1982) (“[T]he right to vote is accorded extraordinary
treatment because it is, in equal protection terms, an extraordinary right: a citizen cannot hope
to achieve any meaningful degree of individual political equality if granted an inferior right
of participation in the political process.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (declaring
a state legislative scheme unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause asserting that
the scheme harmed the right to have each vote weighted equally.).
120
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (“It is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount [in an election].”) (citing
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)); FCC v. Allentown Broad.
Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361–62 (1955).
121
Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. 367 (holding the FCC can regulate airtime that
broadcasters provide candidates to ensure voters were able to hear from all candidates).
122
Id. But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (holding a state statute imposing 100foot boundary restriction on distribution of campaign materials on election day
constitutional).
123
See Leventhal, supra note 115.
124
Castiglione, supra note 91, at 353.
125
See Reynolds, supra note 63.
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government are intertwined, campaigns should comply with constitutional
dictates.126
IV.

THE RIGHT OF ACCESS AND CAMPAIGNS

Despite declining to hold that the press has privileges superior to that
of the ordinary individual, the Court has recognized that the government may
not discriminate between different members of the press.127 When it comes
to accessing government buildings, courts have acknowledged that the press
has a right of access and that the government may not discriminate between
different news outlets.128
A. The Right to Access: Newsgathering
The right of access cases originated with the Press’s access to criminal
trials. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, the Court held the public, and
by extension the press, had a right of access to observe criminal trials under
the First Amendment.129 The Court reasoned that freedoms of speech and
the press shared “a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”130 It
considered open trials vital to the public’s ability to obtain information on
the government.131 “[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news,” it
reasoned, “freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”132 The Court
therefore held that in places “traditionally open to the public” there was a
“right of access.”133 In the context of criminal proceedings, the Court would
126

But see George F. Will, Elections and Campaigns Are Not the Same Thing, WASH.
POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/elections-and-campaignsare-not-the-same-thing/2015/05/27/72d0ce42-03c6-11e5-a428c984eb077d4e_story.html?utm_term=.1a0e51896beb.
127
See Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 225 (1987) (holding that a
tax on magazines that were not “religious, professional, trade or sports periodical[s]” was
unconstitutional); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 576 (1983) (holding a special tax that applies only to certain newspapers
unconstitutional.).
128
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1984) (“Regulations which permit the
Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated
under the First Amendment.”).
129
448 U.S. 555 (1980). The Court had previously held that the accused has the right to
a public trial in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979). Richmond Newspapers
is significant in that it prevented a nongovernment actor (the accused) from closing his trial
to the general public.
130
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
131
Id. at 575–76 (“‘[The] First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the
self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information
from which members of the public may draw.’”) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
132
Id. at 576.
133
Id. at 577.
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go on to expand the right of access to hearings,134 criminal trials involving
minors135 and voir dire.136 In doing so, the Court created a right of access in
criminal trials subject only to the defendant’s right to a fair trial under the
Sixth Amendment.137
Lower courts seized upon the right of access and expanded it
significantly to include areas outside the courtroom including “access [to] a
wide range of civil and administrative government activities.”138 Under the
Equal Protection Clause, courts granted access to government tax records,139
legislative galleries,140 government press conferences141 and executions142
that were previously opened only to select members of the press.143 In doing
so, lower courts shifted the analysis from whether the general public could
obtain access to whether other journalists had access when determining if
there was a right of access.144 “Once unmoored from the Sixth
Amendment[‘s protections]”145 the First Amendment began to assure “the
public and the press equal access once the government has opened its
doors.”146
Despite this expansion, courts recognition that the right of access is
“qualified, rather than absolute, and is subject to limiting considerations such
as confidentiality, security, orderly process, spatial limitations, and doubtless
134

Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding the
public had a right of access to a criminal preliminary hearing).
135
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (granting press access to a
trial involving sexual assault on minors).
136
Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010); Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press
Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (holding the right to access outweighed the government’s
interest to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information).
137
Cristina Carmody Tilley, I Am a Camera: Scrutinizing the Assumption That Cameras
in the Courtroom Furnish Public Value by Operating as a Proxy for the Public, 16 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 697 (2014).
138
Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2012). See Dyk, supra note 48, at 944–
53.
139
McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760, 765–66 (1st Cir. 1951).
140
Kovach v. Maddux, 2378 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
141
Times-Picatune Publ’g Corp. v. Lee, Civil Action No. 88-1325, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3506 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 1988); Borrec v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Haw. 1974).
142
Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
143
But see Ryan Benjamin Witte, It’s My News Too! Online Journalism and
Discriminatory Access to the Congressional Periodical Press Gallery, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH.
208 (2010) (arguing that the government should grant access to the Congressional Press
Gallery for news bloggers).
144
Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (finding the right of
“newsmen” to reasonable access to news of the government extends to access “to places where
other members of the press may go and congregate in the ordinary course of events. In other
words, there is a limited First Amendment right of access to the public galleries, the press
rooms, and the press conferences dealing with state government.”).
145
N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 298 (2d Cir. 2011).
146
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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many others.”147 The Court has drawn several lines where the public’s right
of access is curtailed. For instance, it has distinguished closed-door sessions
from open-door sessions of government, with the press allowed to access the
latter but not the former.148 Safety and impeding the government’s ability to
fulfill its purpose are also compelling reasons to restrict access of the
press.149 Lower courts have expanded and defined these restrictions. Public
polling places, for example, are not considered public under right of access
because of the individual citizen’s right to have a secret ballot.150 The
military’s need for secrecy and concern for journalists’ safety led to denial
of a “right” to embed reporters in military units.151 Most denials of right of
access are based upon privacy rights and national security interests.152
When granting the right of access, these private rights and national
security interests are balanced against two important public policies
necessary to maintain a democratic government. First, the press acts as a
watchdog and surrogate of the public.153 Through proximity, journalists
build rapport with government officials, sources, and others in the industry
to obtain information.154 The press, unlike the average person, has time to
discover, organize, and distribute this information. As stated by the Court,
147

Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Ga.

1981).
148

Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–34 (1974) (“Despite the fact that news gathering
may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own
conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathering in executive session, and the
meetings of private organizations have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime
or disaster when the general public is excluded.”).
149
See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“[T]he prohibition of unauthorized entry
into the White House diminishes the citizen’s opportunities to gather information he might
find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry
into the White House a First Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does not carry
with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”). C.f. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
684–85 (1972) (“Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or
disaster when the general public is excluded . . . .”).
150
See PG Publ. Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]here is a very real
possibility that the presence of reporters during the sign-in period, when individuals are
necessarily exchanging personal information in preparation for casting a private vote, could
concern, intimidate or even turn away potential voters.”).
151
Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
152
United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121 (2d. Cir 1995).
153
Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have
observed that the news media, when asserting the right of access, are surrogates for the
public . . . . The free press is the guardian of the public interest, and the independent judiciary
is the guardian of the free press.”) (internal quotations omitted).
154
Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of
Journalists’ Confidentiality, 1795–2005, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425 (2006); Elizabeth Coenia
Sims, Reporters and Their Confidential Sources: How Judith Miller Represents the
Continuing Disconnect Between the Courts and the Press, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 433, 433–
43 (2007).
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“[w]ithout the information provided by the press most of us and many of our
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions
on the administration of government generally.”155 By acting as a surrogate
and watchdog, the press conducts investigations and provides the results to
the public.156 Thus, citizens gain an understanding of the workings of
government.
Second, the right of access forces government to be more accountable
and open.157 In the context of a criminal trial proceeding, it “permits the
public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process—an
essential component in our structure of self-government.”158 Construing the
right of access broadly “protects the public against the government’s
‘arbitrary interference with access to important information.’”159 Using the
press as a surrogate, “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the
workings of public agencies . . . [and] the operation of government” is
fulfilled.160
In determining whether there is a right of access, courts apply a
balancing test.161 Prior to applying the balancing test, however, the journalist
must meet the two-part test that the Court articulated in Press Enterprise II.
Under this test, courts must determine (1) “whether the place and process
have historically been open to the press and general public”162 and (2)
“whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of
the particular process in question.”163 The first factor examines past practice
by asking if there is “a tradition of opening to the press the matter in
question.”164 If this first factor is present, there is a presumption in favor of
access that can only be overcome by a narrow and specifically tailored
governmental interest.165
The second prong ensures that the press is not excluded from areas
where the public would benefit from the knowledge gathered. Courts review
the government’s action to determine “whether public access plays a positive

155

Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
157
Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Open government has been a
hallmark of our democracy since our nation’s founding.”).
158
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
159
N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 298 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 583 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
160
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 589 (1978).
161
PG Publ. Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 2013); Leigh, 677 F.3d at 899.
162
Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
163
Id. at 9.
164
N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. United States, 836 F.3d 421, 428–29 (3d Cir. 2016).
165
United States v. Bulger, 283 F.R.D. 46, 59 (D. Mass. 2012).
156
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role in the functioning of [the government], whether the [government] has
demonstrated an overriding interest in the viewing restrictions, or whether
the restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”166 In doing so, a
court weighs the benefits achieved against the impairment of the public
good.167 Factors courts have considered include: better analysis of the
government’s policies, increased perceptions of fairness in government
proceedings, serving as a check on corruption through public scrutiny, better
government performance, and discouragement of fraud.168
Regardless, the government cannot grant selective access to specific
members of the press.169 Some courts have taken this to mean that granting
access to a single reporter triggers a requirement to allow access to all
journalists who meet reasonable criteria.170 Other courts have relied on the
public forum doctrine in concluding that government cannot discriminate
between different journalists or their viewpoints.171 This doctrine protects
against a government entity which retaliates against a member of the press.172
B. The Right of Access in the Campaign Context
Since campaigns are state actors subject to the restraints of the
Constitution, journalists and reporters have a right of access.173 Expanding
the right to access to campaigns would promote the policy decisions behind
this right: placing the press in a position to observe and report on the
campaign’s activities and thereby opening the campaign to press scrutiny.
To obtain a right of access, the press must meet both the historic prong and

166

Leigh, 677 F.3d at 900.
PG Publ. Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 111 (3d Cir. 2013).
168
Id. (“[1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing the
public with the more complete understanding of the [proceeding]; [2] promotion of the public
perception of fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the
proceedings; [3] providing a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for
community concern, hostility and emotion; [4] serving as a check on corrupt practices by
exposing the [proceeding] to public scrutiny; [5] enhancement of the performance of all
involved; and [6] discouragement of [fraud].”) (quoting United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833,
839 (3d Cir. 1994)).
169
Milligan, supra note 20, at 1109–11.
170
Getty Images News. Serv. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2002).
But see Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2008).
171
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (quoting Perry
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ.’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
172
McBride v. Vill. of Michiana, 100 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Although no
Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit decisions had, at that time, applied time-honored First
Amendment principles to a situation specifically involving governmental retaliation against a
news reporter, relevant pre-existing case law made the illegality of such retaliation
apparent.”).
173
See discussion supra Part III.
167
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the positive role prong of the Press Enterprise II test.174
1. The History of the Press and Presidential Campaigns
The press has influenced the presidency from the very beginning.175 By
harnessing the power of the press, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and other
Founding Fathers were able to sway Americans to support independence
from Great Britain.176 Shortly before Alexander Hamilton and Thomas
Jefferson created the Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties,
newspapers spread their political ideas.177 Soon “politicians and parties
looked to newspapers as their primary public combatants in the bruising
battles that came after the Jefferson-Hamilton split.”178 When Jefferson won
the presidential election of 1800 with the support of a loose, but large
network of newspapers, “it was more or less accepted that no serious political
movement or presidential candidacy could afford to be without a newspaper
network.”179
For roughly a century thereafter, newspapers were highly partisan.
Editors who supported the victorious presidential candidate were often
granted appointments in the new administration.180 Eventually, presidential
campaigns and parties organized effectively enough to bypass the press and
communicate their messages directly to the people via speaking tours.181
Towards the end of the 19th Century, presidential campaigns began
“systemic organization of communication tactics” aimed at voters.182 By the
1896 presidential election, both Republican and Democratic candidates
organized “campaign headquarters, national speaking tours and produced
written pamphlets meant to ‘educate’ voters” without press involvement.183

174

Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
See RICHARD M. PERLOFF, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: POLITICS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC
IN AMERICA, 16–17 (2008) (“Anyone who thinks that George Washington, the heroic general
of the Revolution, the legendary father of his country, got a free ride from the American press
should think again. George Washington got gored by the newspapers of his era.”).
176
Jeffery L. Pasley, The Role of the Press and Media in American Presidential Elections,
ACADEMIA (2009), https://www.academia.edu/5338845/The_Role_of_the_Press_and_Media
_in_Presidential_Elections (“John Adams, Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander
Hamilton, and others had made heavy use of the press in the movement for independence
from Great Britain . . . .”).
177
Id. at 4.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 5–8.
181
Id. at 8.
182
Austin Corthell, Public Relations and Politics: Background and Contemporary
Practice, LITERATURE REVIEW AND CASE STUDIES, at 4 (Aug. 13, 2008),
https://prtalkingpoints.files.wordpress.com/2008/10/public-relations-and-politics.doc.
183
Id.
175
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Nevertheless, the press, initially through newspapers and later by radio
and television, continued to play a role in presidential elections.184 Starting
with President Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign in 1904, members of the
press rode with presidential candidates in their railway cars.185 While
members of the press had their own car, the candidates made themselves
available for questions and held press conferences between stops.186 This
tradition of the press accompanying the candidate eventually evolved into
the modern press bus where the campaign provides buses the press may use
to follow a presidential candidate’s speaking tour.187
The press has been an integral part of the election process in America
since the passage of the First Amendment. The modern tradition of press
access to a presidential campaign, while not as old as the Constitution, has
existed for more than 100 years. The next question is therefore whether the
electoral process benefits from analyses provided by multiple news outlets.
2. The Importance and Benefits of Press Access
Diverse viewpoints on a presidential campaign are crucial to ensuring
proper scrutiny of presidential candidates.188 Data suggests that individual
newspaper outlets provide different campaign coverage.189 In their research
on campaign election coverage, Daron Shaw and Bartholomew Sparrow
argue that there is an “inner ring” and “outer ring” of press coverage.190 The
inner ring is composed of well-known traditional media outlets such as the
New York Times and Washington Post, while the outer ring is composed of
new media and smaller regional outlets.191 While the amount of coverage
184
See id. (“Print media dominated political campaigns until the advent of radio (1928)
and television (1952).”)
185
See generally TIMOTHY CROUSE, THE BOYS ON THE BUS, COMING TO POWER (1972)
(discussing the advent of the press bus).
186
Id.
187
See Jim Dickerson, Covering the Presidential Campaign: The View from the Press
Bus, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 5, 2007), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publicat
ion/2008/05/20080523105359wrybakcuh0.8072168.html#axzz4WA9yB1X3
[https://we
b.archive.org/web/20151014071445/http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2
008/05/20080523105359wrybakcuh0.8072168.html].
188
Why You Should Care About Media Diversity, THE LEADERSHIP CONF. (last visited
Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.civilrights.org/media/ownership/care.html [https://web.archive.or
g/web/20170515121551/http://www.civilrights.org/media/ownership/care.html]
(“Media
remains a critical element in achieving equal opportunity and full participation in civic life.
Media shapes public views of minority communities as well as views on the causes and scope
of social problems and the best solutions. Thus, access to the media by the broadest sector of
society is crucial to ensuring that diverse viewpoints are presented to the American people,
and that all sectors of society are accurately depicted.”).
189
Daron R. Shaw & Bartholomew H. Sparrow, From the Inner Ring Out: News
Congruence, Cue-Taking, and Campaign Coverage, 52 POL. RES. Q. 323 (1999).
190
Id. at 330.
191
Id.
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dedicated to specific campaign issues did not vary between inner ring and
outer ring news organizations, interpretation and support for the candidates’
stances on those issues did differ.192 This supports a simple proposition: the
media is not a single conglomerate. Regional, ideological, and editorial
opinions all influence coverage of a single candidate.193
Campaigns, meanwhile, have many of the same objectives that the
government has when it releases information, namely the desire to “transmit
a message that persuades skeptics and mobilizes supporters.”194 The conflict
between the candidate’s need to spread his message, combined with the
media’s discretion to publish as it pleases, often creates a rancorous
relationship between media outlets and campaigns.195 Media distortion is
something that candidates fear and campaigns are “engaged in a constant
effort to convince the mass media to reflect their own campaign agendas in
the hopes of influencing public opinion.”196 As the media asserts its own,
independent view of the candidate’s message, candidates may become
increasingly exasperated at the media’s effective refusal to spread the
candidate’s message.197
The multiple viewpoints and political discourse the press fosters are
necessary to allow voters to make a meaningful determination regarding
presidential candidates.198 Conservative analysis of a liberal candidate’s
platform may be critical, while a liberal analysis may praise the same
platform.199 Candidates restricting one, but not the other, effectively engage
192
Id. at 343 (“In short, editors of the outer ring newspapers appear to manifest news
priorities different from those in the inner ring, an observation that casts some doubt on the
phenomena of cue-taking among the nation’s newspapers.”).
193
Id. (“This research suggests that the news media cannot be assumed to be a
monolith.”).
194
Danny Hayes, The Dynamics of Agenda Convergence and the Paradox of
Competitiveness in Presidential Campaigns, 63 POL. RES. Q. 594, 595 (2010).
195
Id.
196
Id. at 596.
197
C.f. id. at 606 (“Electoral competition produces many benefits for the political system
but the accurate representation of candidate discourse by the mass media is not one of
them . . . . Competition draws the media’s attention, but the content of the ensuing coverage
is not likely to help voters make informed judgments.”) (internal citations omitted).
198
See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (“[The] public
interest standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles and, in
particular, to the First Amendment goal of achieving the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources . . . .”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); Akilah N. Folami, Deschooling the News Media-Democratizing Civic Discourse,
34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 489, 503 (2012) (“[P]olitical news and discourse should be deemed
as a public good that is essential to the maintenance of America’s self-governing democracy.
It needs, as a result, to be sustained by a democratic infrastructure that promotes its open and
inclusive production, again with consumer sovereignty considered and encouraged but not
solely determinative.”).
199
See Dan Bernhardt, et al., Political Polarization and the Electoral Effects of Media
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in viewpoint discrimination.200 A banished reporter may be able to obtain
press releases via other news sources, but the journalist cannot evaluate the
new information on a first hand basis.201 Thus, an extension of First
Amendment protection to a right of access to presidential campaigns is
warranted.
V.

THE ENUMERATED REASONS RULE: POLICY REASONS FOR
ADOPTION

This Comment advocates the adoption of the Enumerated Reasons Rule
(the Rule). The Rule is simple; a campaign must provide a list of
requirements necessary for a journalist to obtain a press pass. If a campaign
denies a member of the press access to the campaign, the campaign must
provide its rationale for denying or revoking access. The Rule is
substantially functionalist and some courts have essentially applied the Rule
in right of access cases.202
A. The Courts and the Rule
The Rule is best illustrated in Sherrill v. Knight.203 Sherrill, a journalist,
applied for and was denied a White House press pass by the Secret Service.204
When the Secret Service denied Sherrill’s request for a press pass, it had no
articulated criteria regarding the issuance of a press pass and did not provide
a reason for its refusal to grant the credential.205 After the denial, Sherrill
sued and argued that the Secret Service violated his First and Fifth
Amendment rights.206

Bias, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1092, 1102 (2008) (“The fundamental reason for the inefficiency in
electoral outcomes is that voters choose to listen to biased media. This effect is likely to be
quite stable, even though the population as a whole would be better off if media reported
unbiased news. In principle, voters could become completely informed even with two biased
media, by listening to both.”).
200
C.f. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 894 (1995)
(“[T]he prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that important purpose of the Free
Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing public debate.”).
201
Jonathan Peters, One in Five Journalists Has Had a Credential Request Denied, COL.
JOURNALISM REV. (2014), (citing Hermes et al., supra note 7). http://www.cjr.org/uni
ted_states_project/survey_one_in_five_journalists_has_had_credential_request_denied.php.
202
Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[The White House] must
publish or otherwise make publicly known the actual standard employed in determining
whether an otherwise eligible journalist will obtain a White House press pass.”).
203
Id.
204
Id. at 126.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 128.
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The D.C. Circuit, on appeal, held that the Secret Service “must publish
or otherwise make publicly known the actual standard employed in
determining whether an otherwise eligible journalist will obtain a White
House press pass.”207 Addressing the Secret Service’s argument that the
White House is not open to the public and therefore there is no right of
access, the court found the “White House press facilities [were] made
publicly available as a source of information for newsmen,” and “the
protection afforded newsgathering under the first amendment guarantee of
freedom of the press” could not be “denied arbitrarily or for less than
compelling reasons.”208
The D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Sherrill provides a balance between the
need of the public to have access to news, while still allowing the executive
branch to control who has access to the White House.209 It is “at its heart,
functionalist . . . [w]ith the goal of maximizing public discourse . . . .”210 It
ensures that viewpoint discrimination, arbitrarily denying access, and
frustrating press attempts to obtain information meant for public
consumption will not survive judicial scrutiny.211 The decision, however,
did not go so far as to demand that the Secret Service or President provide
access to all reporters.212 The President and his staff, for example, still had
complete discretion to grant or deny interviews to the press.213
Other courts have applied similar reasoning in the campaign context.
In WPIX, Incorporated v. League of Women Voters, WPIX, a small media
outlet, demanded access to a presidential debate.214 The League allowed
access to the event only if all news channels were willing to pool resources
and use a single feed.215 WPIX refused to join the pool and filed an
injunction demanding its own cameras be granted access to the debate.216
After determining that the League was a state actor and the First Amendment
right of access applied, the court reasoned that granting access to WPIX
would invariably lead to other news organizations requesting physical
access, thus jeopardizing the safety and security of the event.217 By denying
207

Id. at 130.
Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129.
209
See Milligan, supra note 20, at 1107.
210
Id.
211
See Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129–30 (“Not only newsmen and the publications for which
they write, but also the public at large have an interest protected by the first amendment in
assuring that restrictions on newsgathering be no more arduous than necessary, and that
individual newsmen not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of information.”).
212
Milligan, supra note 20, at 1107.
213
Id.
214
595 F. Supp. 1484, 1485 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
215
Id. at 1486.
216
Id. at 1489–91.
217
Id.
208
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access to the debate, the court in WPIX, applied a balancing test between “the
interests to be served by the newsgathering activity at issue” against “the
interest served by the denial of that activity.”218
Other courts have recognized the harm that arises when the government
does not provide reasons for exclusion.219 These issues become prominent
when there is limited space to house and maintain a press pool.220 When
there is no published list of rules, priorities or requirements for the press,
then journalists cannot take steps to correct their applications.221 So while
an agency’s decision may not be arbitrary or discriminatory, without
enumerated reasons for denial, the reporter cannot correct the issues with his
application and the judiciary cannot review the government’s decision.222
Alternatively, having an express policy allows courts to better understand
and efficiently deal with injunctions concerning denials of access.223
B. The Functionalist Approach: Application of the Enumerated
Reasons Rule
Requiring campaigns to publish requirements for press credentials will
allow courts to better balance the benefits and consequences of granting
access. While the Rule does not compel campaigns to grant candidate
interviews, it will avoid some of the pitfalls of allowing the campaign to have
complete discretion to whom it grants press credentials. In particular, the
Rule will (1) prevent judicial overreach, (2) promote diverse viewpoints of a
candidate, and (3) not overburden campaigns.

218

Id. at 1489 (citing Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238,
1245 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Borreca v. Fasi 369 F. Supp. 906, 909 (D. Haw. 1974)).
219
See Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116, 147 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Exclusion of an
individual reporter also carries with it ‘the danger [that] granting favorable treatment to certain
members of the media . . . allows the government to influence the type of substantive media
coverage that public events will receive,’ which effectively harms the public.”) (quoting
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1986)).
220
Getty Images News Servs. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2002).
221
Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[P]rocedural requirements of
notice of the factual bases for denial, an opportunity for the applicant to respond to these, and
a final written statement of the reasons for denial are compelled by the foregoing
determination that the interest of a bona fide Washington correspondent in obtaining a White
House press pass is protected by the first amendment.”).
222
See id.
223
See Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing the complaint
after examining the government agency’s press policy).
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1. The Rule and Judicial Overreach
As a basic premise of American government, courts should not replace
the legislature as the primary lawmaking authority through their rulemaking
and constitutional powers.224 Indeed, many legal scholars have concluded
that the courts should be a last resort for any new law, as the constitutional
framework encourages the legislative and executive branches to tackle
problems instead.225 Nevertheless, it is “the core purpose of the federal
courts in vindicating constitutional rights.”226 Given the history and purpose
of both the right of access and the state actor test, it is natural to extend these
rights to campaigns.227
The Rule’s primary purpose is to prevent judicial overreach.228 As this
rule was created by the D.C. Circuit, its application to executive agencies
illustrates how courts would likely apply the rule to campaigns. D.C. Circuit
opinions229 essentially “[balance] the benefits of transparency with some
other factor . . . .”230 While providing deference to the needs of the
224

See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Nor does this conclusion [that
the Constitution is superior to statute] by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to
the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and
that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of
the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather
than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than
by those which are not fundamental.”).
225
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“This Court,
limited in function in accordance with that premise, does not serve its high purpose when it
exceeds its authority . . . . [When] the Court adds something to the Constitution . . . the Court
in reality substitutes its view of what should be so for the amending process.”). See also Brent
G. McCune, Judicial Overreach and America’s Declining Democratic Voice: The Same-Sex
Marriage Decisions, 20 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 29, 75–76 (2015) (“It seems the people should
always be able to decide matters of such importance as our nation’s fundamental rights and
liberties. After all, ‘the right to make law rests in the people and flows to the government, not
the other way around.’ Another disturbing belief is that ‘the Constitution stands for the
proposition that some rights aren’t left to the whims of a democratic majority.’ This implies
that it is preferable to place those cherished rights in the hands of five judges and their whims.
This cannot be the ideal the Founding Fathers intended for our Nation.”) (internal citations
omitted).
226
Daniel Breen, Avoiding “Wild Blue Yonders”: The Prudentialism of Henry J. Friendly
and John Roberts, 52 S.D. L. REV. 73, 111 (2007).
227
See discussion supra Part II.A.
228
See Milligan, supra note 20, at 1107–08 (“[Sherrill] did not impede on ‘the discretion
of the President to grant interviews or briefings with selected journalists.’ The panel observed
that ‘[i]t would certainly be unreasonable to suggest that because the President allows
interviews with some bona fide journalists, he must give this opportunity to all.’”) (quoting
Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (1977)).
229
Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d
94 (D.D.C. 2003); Getty Images News Servs. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C.
2002).
230
Derigan Silver, Power, National Security and Transparency: Judicial Decision
Making and Social Architecture in the Federal Courts, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 129, 160 (2010).
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executive, “most judges were unwilling to abdicate their judicial function
and took their duty to protect civil liberties seriously, often attempting to
balance transparency with national security.”231 In effect, the rule prevents
“bad forms of selective access (say, press conferences, when equal access
was not thought to discourage grants of access) and, at the same time, permit
good forms of selective access (say, exclusive interviews, when equal access
was thought to discourage grants of access).”232
Requiring presidential campaigns to provide criteria for evaluating
press credential applications allows courts to more easily balance the
concerns of press access and campaign messaging. Courts applying the rule
tend to defer to the entity laying down the rule.233 Interpreting the
campaign’s own rules, the courts would examine them to determine if the
criteria is reasonable234 and its application fair.235 Additionally, courts will
look to see if a campaign’s rules favor a specific viewpoint or overtly
discriminate due to ideology.236 In limiting court review to these areas, the
Rule ensures that the judiciary will not overburden itself or the campaign it
is scrutinizing.
2. The Rule and the Campaign’s Message
Another concern is that the campaign will not be able to control its
message. A campaign’s purpose is to ensure that the public learns about the
candidate and the media can disrupt or distort the candidate’s message.237
Campaigns argue that media outlets that untruthfully or unfairly “spin” the
candidate’s words should not be permitted to continue such behavior.238
231

Id. at 168.
Milligan, supra note 20, at 1107 (internal quotations omitted).
233
See Getty Images News Servs. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112, 119 (D.D.C.
2002) (noting that the military is entitled to “heightened deference”).
234
Nation Magazine v. Dep’t of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1574 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The
activities of the press are subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.”)
(citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972)).
235
See Getty Images News Servs., 193 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (“[The Department of
Defense’s] current approach, which involves making determinations about, inter alia, the
relative audience sizes of media organizations based primarily upon the general knowledge
of a D[epartment of Defense ] official without any published criteria or process for obtaining
relevant information, strikes the Court as somewhat short of ‘reasonable.’”).
236
See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661
(2010) (holding that a viewpoint-neutral rule does not violate the First Amendment). But see
JB Pictures v. Dep’t of Def., 86 F.3d 236, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[I]f plaintiffs’ theory of
‘viewpoint discrimination’ were accepted, virtually any restriction on access to government
facilities . . . would be vulnerable to challenge on grounds of ‘viewpoint discrimination.’
Such a move would represent a complete transformation . . . on access to government
operations not historically open to the public.”).
237
See generally Hayes, supra note 194.
238
Jonathan Easly, Trump Fundraises Off ‘Liberal Media’ Attacks, THE HILL (Aug. 11,
2016, 1:41 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/fundraising/291142-trump-fundraises232
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Applying the Rule against this argument, a court must weigh the
benefits to the press and American people against the harm done to the
campaign by the press.239 As discussed above, viewpoints of presidential
candidates by press members are diverse due to region, editorial makeup,
and ideology.240 The American people, meanwhile, are limiting themselves
to news organizations that support their ideological preferences.241
Americans are therefore receiving their news from a finite number of
subjective viewpoints rather than multiple viewpoints or a broad “objective”
one.242 In order to keep Americans informed, the courts should favor press
access over the campaign’s desire to control its message.
While there is a chance that news outlets would abuse the Rule,
campaigns still have significant power to counter such abuses.243 Campaign
personnel would retain the right to give special access, interviews, first
opportunity to publish leaks, and off record comments to members of the
media that favor the campaign’s purpose.244 The Rule does not disrupt these
tactics.245 Campaigns will still be allowed to reward outlets that write
favorably about their candidates with special interviews.246 Additionally,
with modern social media platforms, the campaign can sidestep the press
altogether and bring its message directly to the people.247 The Rule prevents
off-liberal-media-attacks.
239
Silver, supra note 230 (discussing how courts balance national security interests
against the interest of press access).
240
Shaw & Sparrow, supra note 189.
241
How Americans Get Their News, THE AMERICAN PRESS INST. (Mar. 14, 2014), https://
www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/how-americans-getnews/.
242
See id.; Mitchell, supra note 2.
243
See Glenn Halbrooks, How Politicians Use Media to Win Elections, THE BALANCE
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.thebalance.com/how-politicians-use-media-to-win-elections2315204 (listing ways presidential campaigns use the media).
244
See Friedman, supra note 26, at 290 (“[In Snyder v. Ringgold, No. 97-1358, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 562 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998)] [t]he plaintiff asserted a broad right to
equal access to government information sources and similar treatment to other journalists . . .
would preclude exclusive interviews, the common practice of officials declining to speak to
reporters whom they see as untrustworthy because they have violated confidentiality or
distorted their comments, or selective access to the White House. As a result, plaintiff’s claim
would alter long-accepted journalistic practice, suggesting that it is not a clearly established
right.”).
245
See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (1977) (“Nor is the discretion of the President
to grant interviews or briefings with selected journalists challenged. It would certainly be
unreasonable to suggest that because the President allows interviews with some bona fide
journalists, he must give this opportunity to all.”)
246
See Mulligan, supra note 20, at 1107–08 (“[Sherrill] did not impede on ‘the discretion
of the President to grant interviews or briefings with selected journalists.’ The panel observed
that ‘[i]t would certainly be unreasonable to suggest that because the President allows
interviews with some bona fide journalists, he must give this opportunity to all.’”).
247
See generally JOHN ALLEN HENDRICKS AND DAN SCHILL, PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNING
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only an outright ban or removal of certain press entities.248 In effect, it
balances the relationship between the press and the campaign, and eliminates
the campaign’s ability to banish a particular news outlet based solely on its
coverage of a candidate.249
3. The Rule and the Burden on the Campaign
Critics of the Rule could contend that it places too heavy of a burden
on a campaign. First, they could argue that it subjects the campaigns to
extensive litigation.250 Second, they could claim that under the press-as-atechnology interpretation of the Press Clause (which courts have effectively
adopted)251 expansion of the right of access means any individual can request
and successfully obtain a press pass.252 The Rule addresses both scenarios.
The expansion of the right of access will not place onerous litigation
burdens on the courts or the campaigns. For one, access will be determined
by injunction rather than extensive litigation.253 Once determined by the
grant or denial of an injunction, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel will prevent re-litigation of the issue in multiple jurisdictions.254
Finally, the onus of litigation will be placed on the campaign.255 If the
campaign drafts and abides by sufficiently reasonable and fair criteria, then
the court will not interfere.256 In effect, the campaign can limit the amount
of litigation it engages in.
The Rule allows the campaign to set its own requirements. A campaign
may set aside press passes for those entities with certain levels of readership
or viewership, reserve credentials for a certain number of national, regional,
AND SOCIAL MEDIA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2012 CAMPAIGN (2014).
248

See Kludt, supra note 12; see also Dyk, supra note 48, at 953 (“[I]t is important for
the courts to entertain selective access claims at least where the selectivity can be shown to
have been arbitrary and to have stemmed from government’s desire to suppress the reporting
of government abuses.”); Schreckinger, supra note 6.
249
See discussion supra Part I (“Some media advocates expressed concern that
blacklisting ‘could have a chilling effect on other outlets’ coverage of Trump . . . .’”) (citing
Kludt, supra note 12).
250
See generally Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007
(2013) (analyzing how the United States Supreme Court handles “flood of litigation”
arguments).
251
See Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 788 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The general
public has the same right of access as does the media.”).
252
See discussion supra Part II.B.
253
See WPIX, Inc. v. League of Women Voters, 595 F. Supp. 1484 (1984) (ruling on an
injunction in a right to access case).
254
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, intro. (AM. LAW INST. 1982);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
255
See Getty Images News Servs. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2002)
(ordering the Department of Defense to draft more reasonable criteria for press access).
256
See id.
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and local news outlets, or place a limit on the total number of press passes
available.257 As courts have explained when applying the Rule, safety, size,
and the amount of resources available to the campaign are all valid reasons
for a campaign to structure its requirements.258 These reasons can effectively
and validly limit access.259 The public’s right of access may be limited to
the institutional press, thus preventing everyone from obtaining press
credentials. Additionally, courts have already adopted standards for
determining who is a member of the press when applying the right of access
to government entities.260 Courts could rely on these precedents in denying
access to members of the public who do not work for a media outlet.261 The
Rule therefore adequately balances the burdens and rights that arise when
granting the First Amendment’s right of access to the press when following
campaigns.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The public cannot be properly informed without the press. As
ideological shifts shape American politics and media choice, the press must
have access to press credentials and campaign press conferences.
Presidential campaigns are subject to the First Amendment because they are
state actors that are sufficiently intertwined with government through the
electoral system and federal regulation and support. Therefore, the right of
access to government buildings and press conferences applies to presidential
campaigns. As campaigns are interested in promoting their messages, courts
should apply a balancing test and require campaigns to set definitive and
reasonable guidelines to obtain a press pass. In doing so, courts will ensure
that reporters are not discriminated against because of their ideological
leanings and will promote multiple viewpoints of a presidential candidate.

257

See generally id.; WPIX, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1484.
See generally WPIX, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1484; Getty Images News Servs., 193 F. Supp.
2d 112.
259
See generally WPIX, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1484.
260
See supra text accompanying notes 139–48.
261
See id.
258

